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1. Introduction 
Alongside electricity generation, the transport sector constitutes the largest source of 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  in  the  industrialized w orld. In  2005,  this  sector w as 
responsible for 20% of CO2 emissions in the European Union (EEA 2007:64), roughly 
three fifths of which can be attributed to private automobiles (COM 2007b:2). While 
emissions have decreased in sectors such as industry and agriculture, both dropping 
by 11% between 1990 and 2005, road traffic is one of the few sectors in the EU-151 in 
which emissions have increased, rising by 26% over the same period (EEA 2007:65). 
This trend threatens to thwart efforts to achieve the targets of the Kyoto Protocol, 
under which the EU is to reduce greenhouse gases by 8% relative to the 1990 level by 
20122.  
Against  this  backdrop,  the  European  Commission ( hereafter  Commission)  is 
currently considering a new directive to reduce the per-kilometer CO2 discharge of 
newly  registered  automobiles.  The  proposed  directive, w hich  is  based  on  legally 
codified targets, is motivated by two principal considerations. The first is that the 
transport  sector  has  thus  far  not  been  integrated  into  the  EU’s G reenhouse G as 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which commenced operation in 2005 as the largest 
multi-country certificate trading scheme worldwide. Secondly, it is now a foregone 
conclusion  that  the v oluntary  commitment  of  the  European  Automobile 
Manufacturers Association (ACEA) to reduce average emissions to 140g CO2/km by 
2008, negotiated with the Commission in 1998, will not be met.  
To  maintain  climate  protection  policy  on  track,  the  Commission  published  in 
December 2007 a proposal for reducing the CO2 emissions from private automobiles 
that would set maximum allowable emissions for 2012 depending on the mass of the 
vehicle. The core of the proposal is a so-called limit value curve relating the vehicle 
                                                
1 The EU-15 refers to the 15 original Member States of the European Union. We use the term EU to 
refer to the enlarged union, which includes these members in addition to the 10 new Member States. 
2 The  increase  in  emissions  from  the  transport  sector  is  attributable  to  several  factors,  including 
increases in vehicle kilometers traveled and growing rates of automobile ownership.  In 1990, for 
example, there were 355 vehicles per 1,000 residents in the EU, a figure that increased by 31 % to 465 
vehicles by 2003. The growth in the number of newly registered cars in the EU over this time interval 
reached 36 %, rising from 156 to 212 million (COM 2007a:5).5
mass to a corresponding CO2 emission limit, which is set in such a way that a fleet-
average of 130 grams of CO2 per kilometer is achieved. A key implication following 
from  this  curve  is  that  the  emission  reduction  required  of  heavy v ehicles  is 
disproportionately higher than that of light vehicles. Despite the proposal’s attempt 
to consider vehicle mass,  it has been met with vigorous opposition, particularly from 
Germany.  
In  this  paper, w e  explore  the  basis  for  the  Commission’s  proposal  from  both  an 
economic and technological angle. The following section begins with an overview of 
the  proposal’s  background  and  terms,  subsequently  focusing  on  its  economic 
implications for the highly differentiated automobile market as well as on its cost-
effectiveness in reducing emissions relative to other instruments, such as emissions 
trading. Section 3 scrutinizes key assumptions underpinning the proposal, finding 
that these misrepresent the current state of automotive technology and therefore may 
overestimate the feasibility of achieving the suggested emissions targets. In Section 4, 
alternative  reduction  targets  are  consequently  proposed  that  are  argued  to  more 
accurately reflect the industry’s technological evolution to date. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Commission’s Proposal and its Economic Valuation 
In  recognition  of  the  accumulating  scientific  evidence  on  global w arming,  the 
Commission has for several years taken an offensive posture in formulating policies 
that aim at mitigating the role of human agency in climate change (COM 2007a). The 
stabilization and, ultimately, reduction of greenhouse gases in the EU is regarded to 
be a cornerstone of this effort. By 2004, however, greenhouse gas emissions in the 
EU-15 decreased by only 1.5% relative to the base year of 1990, a modest achievement 
relative  to  the K yoto  target  of  an 8% reduction  by  2012 ( EEA  2007:24). Much  is 
consequently  riding  on  the  success  of  the  Emissions  Trading  Scheme ( ETS)  in 
realizing this goal. This instrument was introduced in 2005 as a centerpiece of climate 
policy,  and  is  considered  in  the  environmental  economics  literature  to  be  an 
economically  efficient  means  of  effectively  reducing  emissions (Baumol,  Oates 
1971:47).  6
Among the participants of the ETS are electricity producers and the most energy-
intensive industry branches. Road transport is not included. Rather than pursuing 
the  integration  of  this  sector,  as  is  planned  for  air  traffic,  the  Commission  is 
submitting  a  legislative  proposal  for  reducing  the  CO2  emissions  of  private 
automobiles. This proposal falls under a more general strategy for the reduction of 
CO2  emissions  from  road  traffic, w hich  is  based  on  three  pillars: ( i) voluntary 
commitments  of  the  associations  of  European,  Japanese,  and K orean  auto 
manufacturers, ( ii)  guidelines  on  labeling  and  the  provision  of  information  to 
consumers,  and ( iii)  tax  measures  that  favor v ehicles  that  have  light  fuel 
requirements. After reviewing the strategy in 2007, the Commission concluded that 
without additional policy measures, the goal of reaching the level of 120g CO2/km 
by 2012 could not be reached (COM 2007a:8). The prevailing view is that these three 
pillars should now be complemented by legislative limits on CO2 emissions from 
newly  registered v ehicles, w hich  are  to  be  enforced w ith  the  threat  of  penalty 
payments for non-compliance (COM 2007b:21).  
In December 2007, the Commission published a draft of a new directive that allows 
per-kilometer CO2 discharges to increase with the mass of vehicles (COM 207b:26). 
The  core  of  this  draft  is  a  so-called  limit v alue  curve, w hose  slope  is  such  that 
manufacturers of heavier vehicles, which arguably also tend to be safer and more 
comfortable  than  lighter v ehicles,  must  achieve  higher  percentage  reductions  in 
emissions than manufacturers of lighter vehicles. The limit value curve is given by 
the following linear equation: 
(1)     ECO2 = 130 + 0,0457 (M – 1.289), 
where M is the vehicle mass in kilograms and ECO2 are the allowed per-km emissions. 
According to Equation (1), the CO2 discharge of a new car with a mass of 1,289 kg, 
which is nearly identical to the current sales-weighted average of 1.288.8 kg (COM 
2007 c:5), must be reduced to 130 g CO2/km by 2012.  
A convincing justification for the shape of this curve, reproduced in Figure 1, has 
regrettably been absent from the Commission’s public communications. In particular, 
the slope of 0.0457 of the limit value cure is a critical parameter that inexplicably 7
remains  completely  unmotivated  and  seemingly  arbitrary. Indeed, w hether  the 
proposed limit value curve reflects the future state of technological development and 
thereby the most cost-effective means of reaching the emission targets remains an 
open question of immediate relevance from a public welfare perspective. 















































(-- --) the Commission’s reference line: ECO2 = 162,8 + 0,095 (M – 1.289) 
(-----) the limit value curve: ECO2 = 130 + 0,0457 (M – 1.289) 
 
Of equal relevance are the likely market impacts. It is reasonable to assume that the 
proposed  limits  on  per-km  emissions w ill  have v arying  effects  on  the  highly 
differentiated market segments of the automobile industry, so that the competitive 
position of individual manufacturers will necessarily change relative to the current 
market  equilibrium. Manufacturers  situated  in  market  segments  in w hich  the 
specified emissions are relatively difficult to attain will incur higher compliance costs 
than other manufacturers, and these increases will tend to be passed on to consumers 
in  the  form  of  higher  prices.  This  transfer  of  higher  costs w ill  not  occur w ithout 
undermining the manufacturer’s competitiveness, however, because the demand for 
its own vehicles will not least depend on the prices of other vehicles in the same 8
market  segment.3 I n  contrast  to  the  transfer  of  costs  that  are  borne  by  all 
manufacturers, the directive is likely to result in a shift in demand away from those 
manufacturers that incur a relatively high increase in costs. To craft a directive that 
did not influence the competitive situation of the individual manufacturers in such a 
highly  interdependent  market w ould  require  close  consideration  of  the  technical 
possibilities  for  emissions  reductions  as w ell  as  the  market  structure.  Such  an 
analysis, however, is not recognizable in this case. 
Based on a reading of the Commission’s public documents, the working assumption 
seems to be that the measure will induce considerable incentives for the development 
of  fuel-saving  technologies,  as  non-compliance w ith  the  allowable  emissions w ill 
result in heavy fines starting in 2012. For that year, a fine of 20 € for each additional 
gram  of  CO2  per k ilometer  over  the  allowed  limit  is  suggested. Multiplying  this 
figure with the annual number of vehicles sold in a fleet yields the total penalty. 
From 2013 until 2015, the specific fines are to rise successively, initially to 35, then 60, 
and finally 95 € (COM 2007b:21). If, for example, Mitsubishi were neither able to 
reduce the average per-km emissions nor the average weight of its vehicles by 2012, 
it would discharge 41g/km more CO2 than would be allowed according to the limit 
value  curve,  thereby  requiring  that  the  manufacturer  pay  a  fine  of 8 20 €  to  the 
Commission w ith  the  sale  of  each  car. By  2014,  a  fine  of  2,460 €  would  be  due, 
increasing  to 3 ,895 €  by  2015. It  is  reasonable  to  conclude  that  the  cost  increases 
resulting from either these fines or from the technological investments to avoid them 
would at least partially be passed onto consumers.  
The CO2 abatement costs that emerge from this penalty structure are substantial. For 
example, given a total of 100,000 kilometers driven over the life of the automobile, 
the penalty of 20 € in 2012 for each gram of CO2/km exceeding the limit curve (or 20 
                                                
3 The automobile market is a textbook example of an interdependent market structure – the individual 
manufacturers each face a demand for their product that is both a function of price-awareness as well 
as product loyalty. Due to these two influences, the demand for the product is negatively related to its 
own price and positively related to the prices of its competitors. The demand for automobiles in each 
individual market segment is likely to be considerably more elastic than for the automobile market as 
a whole. Given the modest number of manufacturers, this creates considerable strategic interaction in 
the setting of prices. An additional important factor is that the automobile industry is comprised of 
manufacturers who set prices based on the other manufacturers in their market segment, but which 
are also oriented to consumers with different preferences, particularly with respect to the mass and 
other associated characteristics of the vehicle.  9
Million € for each ton of CO2/km) would imply a CO2 price of 200 €/ton. If the life 
of the automobile was increased to 150,000 km, the corresponding figure would be 
133 €/t, and would fall to the still high price of 100 €/t for an automobile driven 
200,000 km. If we instead reference the penalty of 95 € for each gram of CO2/km 
announced for 2015, the corresponding CO2 abatement costs are 950 €/t, 633 €/t and 
475 €/t, respectively. An appreciation for the sheer magnitude of these figures is 
given by a comparison with Böhringer and Löschel’s (2002) estimate of 30 €/t for the 
medium-run  price  of  certificates  on  the  ETS, w hich  sets  the  benchmark  for  CO2 
abatement costs and has to date not been exceeded.  
Reliance  on  the  ETS  as  a  mechanism  for  reducing  greenhouse  gases  from  road 
transport, as is planned for air traffic, thus appears to be a sounder approach than the 
legislative  mandates  proposed  by  the  Commission.  The  caps  on  emissions  in  the 
participating sectors and the possibility of trading certificates among them ensures 
that emissions will tend to be reduced in those sectors where it is economically most 
efficient  to  do  so.  The  trading  scheme  therefore  can  be  expected  to  serve  as  a 
substantial  and  cost-effective  contribution  to  reaching  the  EU’s  climate  protection 
objectives. Moreover, such a scheme affords greater transparency by revealing the 
actual technological advancement of the individual manufacturers, as it obliges them 
to decide between directly reducing emissions and alternatively acquiring emission 
certificates.  Fuel  taxation,  of  course,  represents  an  equally  transparent  policy 
measure, as it directly confronts motorists with increased costs of driving. Such taxes 
can therefore serve to internalize the social costs of fuel combustion, in turn reducing 
fuel consumption and emissions, while at the same time providing a source of public 
revenue (Storchmann 2001).  
By contrast, it remains unclear whether the Commission’s proposal can lead to an 
actual reduction of CO2 emissions, as it focuses on emissions per driven kilometer – 
that is, on energy efficiency – rather than on the absolute emissions level. Reason for 
skepticism is illustrated by the U.S. experience with the so-called CAFE standards 
implemented in 1975, the reliance on which has left the U.S. car fleet one of the least 
efficient in the industrialized world. Recent trends in Europe cast further doubt on 
the effectiveness of increased efficiency in achieving environmental objectives: At the 10
same time that the energy efficiency of new cars was improving, increasing by an 
average of 15% between 1995 and 2005, both vehicle mass and performance were 
increasing  in  tandem,  by  some  28%  over  the  same  time  period ( COM  2007a:5). 
Although this resulted in a 12.4 % reduction of the per-km emissions in the EU-15 
between 1995 and  2004,  from 186 to 163 g  CO2/km ( COM  2007  c:2),  the  total 
discharge of CO2 emissions in the transport sector increased considerably over the 
same time interval. 
This increase can at least be partially attributed to the so-called rebound effect, a 
behavioral  response  to  more  efficient  technology w hose  impact  typically  receives 
short shrift in the analysis of efficiency standards. In the case of automobiles, the 
rebound effect refers to the tendency to drive more when the per kilometer costs of 
driving  is  decreased  through  increased  efficiency.  A  report  from  the U nited 
Kingdom’s Energy Research Centre concludes that if rebound effects are ignored, the 
contribution  that  energy  efficiency  makes  to  reducing  carbon  emissions w ill  be 
overestimated (Sorrell 2007).  This conclusion is bolstered by a recent econometric 
analysis of car-owning households in Germany (Frondel, Peters, Vance 2007), which 
finds  that  up  to 60% of  the  potential  greenhouse  gas  savings  from  improved 
efficiency could be lost to more driving from the lower per-kilometer costs of vehicle 
usage.  
3. The State of Technology and its Progress 
Irrespective of these economic considerations, there still remains the question of how 
the limit value curve was conceived. Ideally, it would represent the lowest per-km 
emissions achievable given the future state of technology. Assuming that this ideal 
limit value curve could be determined precisely, this foundation would provide for a 
compelling argument for the obligatory compliance with this upper bound, both for 
the  public  and  the  manufacturers.  After  all,  those  at  the  technological v anguard 
would be saddled with relatively lighter emission reduction obligations and would 
thereby incur lower costs than the stragglers. 11
Since such an ideal limit value curve refers to both the current state of technology 
and future technological developments, it is, of course, not directly observable. Yet, it 
could  be  substituted  by  referring  to  an  estimate  based  on  the  current  state  of 
technology. As suggested by the Commission’s publications (COM 2007c:4), such an 
estimate is represented by the reference line in Figure 1. Depending on expectations 
concerning  the  pace  of  technological  development,  the  future  requirements  could 
then be defined by referring to this line in order to approach the desired average 
target.  For  example,  one  could  set  the  compulsive  targets  at  a  uniform  absolute 
reduction w ith  regard  to  this  reference  line,  irrespective  of v ehicle  mass. 
Consequentially, the limit value curve would lie parallel to the reference line such 
that the targeted average of 130 g CO2/km would just be achieved.  
By  ascribing  the  limit v alue  curve  a  much  smaller  slope  than  the  reference  line 
displayed in Figure 1, however, manufacturers of heavier vehicles must contend with 
higher  reduction  liabilities    even  in  percentage  terms    than  their  competitors 
producing  lighter v ehicles.  This  relation,  according  to w hich  future  compulsory 
reduction  liabilities  disproportionately  increase w ith  the  mass  of  the v ehicle,  is 
shown in the last two columns of Table 1. Presumably, the assumption underlying 
the limit value curve (1) is that manufacturers of vehicles with higher masses and 
engine  power  have  correspondingly  higher  potential  for  achieving  cost-efficient 
reductions in emissions relative to the current state. Although this may well be true, 
it would nevertheless be desirable to provide convincing evidence to buttress this 
assumption. 
Even more disconcerting, though, is the fact that the reference line put forward by 
the  Commission ( COM  2007c:4)  does  not  accurately  reflect  the  current  state  of 
technology, as a closer look at Figure 1 reveals. Although a clear explanation of how 
the line was estimated is lacking, it can be readily shown that its slope of roughly 9.5 
g CO2/km for each 100 kilograms of vehicle mass is based on a linear regression that 
excludes  the  average v alues  for  both  Subaru (1384 kg  and  216  g  CO2/km)  and 
Porsche (1596 kg and 282 g CO2/km). As both manufacturers produce vehicles that 
are among those with the highest average masses, their inclusion in the estimated 
regression would result in a substantial increase of the slope to 21.6 g CO2/km for 12
each 100 kg vehicle mass, over double that of the Commission’s reference line (Figure 
2). Ignoring  this  data  in  the  calculation  not  only  fails  to  reflect  the  technological 
status quo, but also implies that both manufacturers have neglected opportunities to 
reduce emissions given current technologies, a rather serious accusation for which no 
justification is provided. 
Table  1.  Key Figures for major  Manufacturers and Targets of the Commission (COM 
2007c:5). 
 Figures  from  2006 Targets 
  Mass Emissions  Sales  Emissions Reduction  by 
Manufacturer  [kg] [g CO2/km] [in 1 000]  [g CO2/km] [g CO2/km] [%] 
PSA Peug.-Citr. 1201 142 1882.2 1 26.0 16.0  11.3 
Renault 1 234 147  1232.2 1 27.5 19.5  13.3 
Fiat 1112 144  1050.9  121.9  22.1 15.3 
Honda 1 261 153  229.8 128.7  24.3 15.9 
Toyota 1 214 152 773.3  126.6  25.4 16.7 
GM 1257 157  1424.8 128.5  28.5 18.1 
Ford 1319  162 1490.3  131.4  30.6 18.9 
Volkswagen 1366 165  2744.8 133.5  31.5  19.1 
Hyundai 1349  165  461.9  132.7 32.3 19.6 
Nissan 1 202 164  273.9 126.0 38.0  23.2 
Suzuki 1152 164  178.6  123.7 40.3  24.5 
Mitsubishi 1 245 169  101.1  128.0 41.0  24.3 
Mazda 1 296 173  229.1 130.3  42.7  24.7 
BMW 1453  182 740.0  137.5 44.5  24.5 
DaimlerChrysler 1472 184  860.8  138.4  45.6  24.8 
Subaru 1384  216 31.5  134.3  81.7  37.8 
Porsche 1596  282 39.1  144.0  138.0  48.9 
Average*  1288.8  159.2    130.0    
*weighted by 2006 sales shares. 
This misleading illustration has considerable implications for the evaluation of the 
current  state  of  the  industry.  According  to  the  Commission’s  reference  line,  the 
French and Italian manufacturers are currently at the technological forefront, as they 
produce  cars w hose  per-km  emissions  fall  under  the  supposed  industry  average 13
(Figure 1). By comparison, the German manufacturers have an average performance, 
whereby Volkswagen is slightly below the reference line and the heavier BMW and 
Daimler-Chrysler vehicles are slightly above it, while Porsche falls clearly short of an 
environmentally acceptable performance.  
If one refers the actual reference line obtained from a regression that includes Subaru 
and Porsche, then the impression gleaned from Figure 1 changes markedly (Figure 
2). As before, it is quite obvious that the per-km emissions of vehicles from Porsche 
are quite high. But a reversal has occurred for Fiat’s fleet, which now lies above the 
actual reference line and is thus identified as environmentally lagging. In contrast, 
the  fleets  of  the  large G erman  manufacturers  Volkswagen, BMW,  and D aimler-
Chrysler  now  all  lie  below  the  reference  line,  indicating  that  these  are  the  front 
runners. In fact, their average emissions lie even further below the actual reference 
line than the French manufacturers, which according to the Commission’s depiction 
are among the leaders.  
By taking into account the technological advancements that have been achieved to 
date, the proposal’s allocation given by the limit value curve has far-reaching and 
acute consequences: While the actual reference line indicates a current increase of the 
per-km emissions of roughly 21.6 g CO2/km for each additional 100 kilograms of 
mass, the limit value curve indicates a considerably smaller increase of roughly 4.6 g 
CO2/km for each 100 kilograms. It is only such a comparison that clearly reveals the 
high  requirements  on  manufacturers  of  large v ehicles  that  are  imposed  by  the 
Commission’s proposal. 
In sum, the Commission’s plan implies ambitious reductions of per-km emissions for 
manufacturers of cars with higher masses. In particular, BMW and Daimler-Chrysler 
must  contend w ith  liabilities  of  up  to  nearly  25 %, w hereas  French  and I talian 
manufacturers are in a relatively favourable position, with future reduction liabilities 
ranging  between 11 % and 15 %. In  light  of  potential  effects  on  the  competitive 
positions  of  the  individual  manufacturers,  the  emerging  criticism  of  the 
Commission’s proposal from the German public as well as from the German Federal 
Government appears to be understandable. In this regard, it bears emphasizing that 14
even a uniform proportional liability of 20 % for all manufacturers would lead to 
higher  absolute  reduction  liabilities  for  producers  of v ehicles w ith  higher  masses 
compared to their lower-mass  competitors. In the case of BMW, for example, the 
required reduction would be 36 g CO2/km, compared with less than 30 g CO2/km 
for Fiat. 














































(-- --) actual reference line: ECO2 = 169,3 + 0,2163 (M – 1.289)  
(-----) limit value curve: ECO2 = 130 + 0,0457 (M – 1.289) 
Primarily,  though,  this  criticism  is j ustified  by  the  Commission’s q uestionable 
illustration  of  the  current  state  of  technology, w hich  fails  to  put  the  previous 
technological efforts of the German car industry in perspective: the relatively low 
emissions  of  Volkswagen, BMW,  and D aimler-Chrysler  revealed  by  Figure  2  are 
obviously  not  acknowledged.  The  following  section  consequently  presents  three 
alternative allocation rules that consider the progress made by these manufacturers 
to a greater extent. 
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4. Alternative Types of Allocation 
Each of the three alternative proposals discussed below takes the average reduction 
target of 130 g CO2/km as given. The proposals are constructed such that the goal 
would be reached if all the manufacturers maintained their current sales figures and 
reduced  the  per k m  CO2  emissions  according  to  the  proposed  limits.  Obviously, 
numerous  other  allocation  rules  can  be j ustified  that  lead  to  the  same  average 
reduction of 130 g CO2/km, including rules based on non-linear reference targets. To 
maintain the tenor of the Commission’s original proposal, the following alternatives 
are all based on linear reference lines. 
Alternative (i) takes the reference line published by the Commission – with its slope 
of 9.5 g  CO2/km  for  each  additional 100 kg  –  as  a  reference  and  binds  the 
manufacturers to a proportional reduction of 20.2% instead of the disproportionate 
reduction  given  by  the  limit v alue  curve. Manufacturers  of v ehicles w ith  lower 
masses would consequently have a slightly higher burden than that suggested by the 
Commission. As an example, Fiat would be obliged to reduce their per-km emissions 
by 19 % instead of 15.3 % (Table 2). This alternative’s moderately higher burden for 
manufacturers of lower-mass vehicles is formally shown by the associated new target 
line ( Figure 3), w hose  slope  of 0.0759 is  significantly  higher  than  the  limit v alue 
curve’s slope of 0.0457. 
As with alternative (i), alternative (ii) would maintain the Commission’s reference 
line – despite its questionable illustration of the current state of technology – but 
drop the line in parallel so as to comply with the average target of 130 g CO2/km. 
Manufacturers of smaller cars with per-km emissions located on the Commission’s 
reference line would consequently have to achieve higher percentage reductions than 
their heavier competitors located further along the line. Accusations of unfairness 
could be rebutted by pointing out that this line’s slope of 9.5 g CO2/km for each 100 
kilograms is, in any case, not representative of the true relation between vehicle mass 
and specific CO2 emissions. With particular regard to the reduction requirements of 
the G erman  manufacturers,  alternative ( ii) would  recognize  their  technological 
competence  in  combining  car  performance  and  environmental  sustainability.  For 16
example, BMW would be obliged to reduce their emissions by 36 instead of 45 g 
CO2/km (Table 3). Similar to alternative (i), finally, alternative (ii) also has the virtue 
of rewarding low-emission manufacturers with modest reduction targets, while it 
simultaneously punishes the stragglers with ambitious targets. 
Table 2: Current Emissions and Alternative Reduction Liabilities. 
Manufacturer  Current 
emissions 
[g CO2 / 
km] 














(23,2%) to the 
actual reference 
line 
PSA Peug.-Citr. 142  11.3 %  13.1 %  14.3 %  18.7 % 
Renault  147  13.3 %  14.4 %  15.1 %  17.8 % 
Fiat  144  15.3 %  19.0 %  21.4 %  30.1 % 
Honda  153  15.9 %  16.4 %  16.8 %  18.0 % 
Toyota 152 16.7  %  18.2 %  19.2 %  22.6 % 
GM  157  18.1 %  18.7 %  19.1 %  20.6 % 
Ford 162  18.9 %  18.3 %  18.0 %  16.7 % 
Volkswagen  165  19.1 %  17.7 %  16.8 %  13.4 % 
Hyundai  165  19.6 %  18.4 %  17.7 %  15.2 % 
Nissan 164  23.2 %  24.7 %  25.8 %  29.5 % 
Suzuki 164  24.5 %  27.1 %  28.7 %  34.6 % 
Mitsubishi 169  24.3 %  25.0 %  25.5 %  27.4 % 
Mazda 173  24.7 %  24.5 %  24.5 %  24.2 % 
BMW 182  24.5 %  21.7 %  20.0 %  13.6 % 
Daimler-Chrys. 184  24.8 %  21.8 %  19.9 %  12.8 % 
Subaru  216  37.8 %  36.5 %  35.6 %  32.5 % 
Porsche  282  48.9 %  45.6 %  43.5 %  35.8 % 
Average  159.2  130.0  130.0  130.0  130.0 
*weighted by 2006 sales shares. 
The third alternative would refer the actual reference line from Figure 2, with its 
slope  of  21.6  g  CO2/km  for  each 100 kilograms,  and  introduce  a  proportional 
reduction of 23.2 %. Note that with respect to the actual reference line, Volkswagen, 
BMW,  and D aimler-Chrysler  emerge  at  the  technological v anguard.  They w ould 
consequently contend with a lighter emission reduction burden than that embodied 17
in the Commission proposal. Fiat, by contrast, would be penalized for its relatively 
high emissions given its low mass (Figure 5). 














































(-- --) the Commission’s reference line: ECO2 =162,84 + 0,0951 (M-1.289) 
(-----) limit value curve: ECO2 = 130 + 0,0457 (M – 1.289) 
(-----)  proportional  decrease by 20,2 %:  ECO2 =130 + 0,0759 (M-1.289) 
 
In  particular,  Fiat w ould  have  to  reduce  their  per-km  emissions  by  some 44 g 
CO2/km, roughly twice the amount suggested by the Commission proposal (Table 
3). In contrast, the reduction liabilities of BMW and Daimler shrink by almost half. 
Nevertheless, it bears emphasizing that, in absolute terms, the technological pioneers 
and  manufacturers  of  low-mass v ehicles  still  have  a  lighter  burden  than  the 
technological laggards and manufacturers of high-mass vehicles. Indeed, all three 
alternatives share the imposition of a high reduction burden for Porsche, the evident 

















































(-- --) the Commission’s reference line: ECO2 =162,84 + 0,0951 (M-1.289) 
(-----) limit value curve: ECO2 = 130 + 0,0457 (M – 1.289) 
(-----) decrease parallel to EC reference line: ECO2 = 130 + 0,0951 (M-1289) 













































(-----) actual reference line: ECO2 = 169,3 + 0,2163 (M – 1.289)  
(-----) limit value curve: ECO2 = 130 + 0,0457 (M – 1.289) 
(-----) proportional decrease to the actual reference line: ECO2 = 130 + 0.1661 (M-1.289) 
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(23,2%) to the 
actual 
reference line  
PSA Peug.-Citr. 142 1 26.0 16.0 123.3 18.7 121.7 20.3 115.4 26.6 
Renault 147  127.5 19.5 125.8 21.2 1 24.8 22.2 1 20.9 26.1 
Fiat 144  121.9  22.1 116.6 27.4 113.2 30.8 100.6 43.4 
Honda 153  128.7  24.3 127.9 25.1 127.4 25.6 125.4 27.6 
Toyota 152 1 26.6  25.4 124.3 27.7 122.9 29.1 117.6 34.4 
GM 157  128.5  28.5 127.6 29.4 127.0 30.0 124.7 32.3 
Ford 162 131.4  30.6  132.3 29.7 132.9 29.1 135.0 27.0 
Volkswagen 165  133.5  31.5  135.9 29.1 137.3 27.7 142.8 22.2 
Hyundai 165  132.7 32.3 134.6 30.4 135.7 29.3 140.0 25.0 
Nissan 164  126.0 38.0 123.4 40.6 121.7 42.3 115.6 48.4 
Suzuki 164  123.7 40.3 119.6 44.4 117.0 47.0  107.3 56.7 
Mitsubishi 169  128.0 41.0 126.7 42.3 125.8 43.2 1 22.7 46.3 
Mazda 173  130.3  42.7 130.5 42.5 130.7 42.3 131.2 41.8 
BMW 182 137.5  44.5  142.5 39.5 145.6 36.4  157.3 24.7 
Daimler-Chry. 184  138.4  45.6  143.9 40.1  147.4 36.6  160.4 23.6 
Subaru  216 134.3  81.7  137.2 78.8 139.1 76.9  145.8 70.2 
Porsche  282 144.0  138.0 153.3 128.7 159.2 122.8 181.0 101.0
Average*  159.2  130.0  130.0   130.0   130.0  
*weighted by 2006 sales shares. 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
It is perhaps no surprise that those most adversely affected by a political intervention 
are  often  the  loudest  critics. Nevertheless,  the  analysis  undertaken  in  this  paper 
suggests that the resistance met by the Commission’s proposal to limit per-km CO2 
emissions, particularly in Germany, has merit and thus deserves consideration as the 
legislative  process  continues.  Although  one  might  expect  that  the  basic  concept 
underlying the proposal is well-founded, particularly given the extensive economic 
reverberations  that  are  likely  to  follow,  the  logic  underpinning  the  details  of  its 
implementation remains opaque. This lack of transparency applies especially to the 
cornerstone of the proposal, the so-called limit value curve, which relates future per-20
km CO2 emissions to the vehicle mass, leaving the outsider with the impression that 
it was set arbitrarily. 
A similar impression is unfortunately conveyed by the Commission’s questionable 
depiction of the current state of technology, which completely ignores the influence 
of two manufacturers, Porsche and Subaru. We argue that any given curve specifying 
future allowable emissions must be based on both the correctly determined current 
state  of  technology  and  the  expected  technological  progress.  Since  an  accurate 
anticipation  of  the  technological  progress  remains  difficult, w e  used  the 
Commission’s proposal as a basis for developing three alternative curves ensuring 
that the target of 130 g CO2/km by 2012 is achieved while simultaneously allocating 
the  reduction  burdens  to  the v arious  car  manufacturers  in  different w ays.  Our 
primary  concern w as  in  providing j ustifications  for  the  alternative  allocation 
methods. 
Given the high CO2 abatement cost linked to the Commission’s proposal as well as 
the  principal  difficulties  in  determining  and  incorporating  technological  progress 
into per-km emissions targets, the question arises as to whether policy should instead 
be  aimed  at  absolute  reductions  of  emissions, w hich  is,  ultimately, w hat  climate 
protection is about. The integration of road traffic into the Emissions Trading Scheme 
affords one promising alternative. Another promising option would be to harmonize 
and gradually increase petroleum taxation across Europe. In contrast to its standing 
in the Commission’s proposal, this is an area in which Germany clearly stands out as 
one  of  Europe’s  leaders, w ith  a  fuel  taxation  rate  second  only  to  the U nited 
Kingdom’s. With respect to per-km emissions, by contrast, this paper has shown that 
the identification of leaders and laggards is less evident, and may consequently be 
subject to highly contentious and ultimately counterproductive politicking. 21
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